Executive summary
In just a few years public opinion of the European venture capital industry has gone from apathy to euphoria to skepticism. Unfortunately, much of the public debate has been based on general impressions and anecdotal evidence, such as the numerous boomand then bust-stories of Internet investments. Behind these volatile perceptions, what are the longer-term facts about European venture capital?
The Survey of European Venture Capital (SEVeCa) is the largest academic study to data about the industry. Its goal is to provide objective data on the state of the European venture capital industry. It was headed by three leading experts on European venture capital: Laura Bottazzi (IGIER-Bocconi University and CEPR), Marco Da Rin (Turin University, ECGI, IGIER-Bocconi University) and Thomas Hellmann (Stanford University, USA). They collected data on the activities of European venture capital firms for the period [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . The data includes information on more than 1300 investment companies, more than 400 venture capital partners, and more than 150 venture capital funds.
The SEVeCa study is the largest and most ambitious academic study of the European venture capital industry to date. The main data collection for SEVeCa consisted of a survey sent to all registered European venture capital firms. The data was augmented with publicly available sources (e.g. web pages) and numerous direct inquiries at the venture capital firms. The overall response rate of 15% should be considered a considerable success for this kind of research.
The main findings from the research project are that the European venture capital industry is much more integrated than previously believed. It also has significant links to the US, and is increasingly emulating US investment practices. However, some aspects remain distinctively European, such as the prominence of banks and corporations as investors. And further removing barriers to cross-country investments could provide an important boost to the industry.
It is often believed that European venture capitalists are purely local investors that do not venture beyond their country borders. The SEVeCa study disproves this belief, showing that the European venture capital market is surprisingly integrated. First, 27% of all venture firms in our sample have a secondary office in a foreign country. Second, 25% of all venture capital firms have partners that come from a foreign country. Third, 24% of investments are made in foreign companies. The fraction of deals with foreign investors is particularly high in industries such as in financial services (42%), media and entertainment (34%) or telecommunications (31%).
The US is by far the most popular destination for foreign investments, accounting for almost a third of all foreign deals. There are multiple additional links between the European and US venture capital market. For example, as much as 34% of all European venture capitalists had some work experience in the US.
A unique feature of the SEVeCa research project was to examine the human capital basis of the European venture capital firms. By linking data on investments deals to the partners who are in charge, the study documents the interrelationships between human capital and investment styles. For example, the data shows that partners with higher degrees are more likely to make early stage deals. Having an advanced degree (Masters or PhD) also makes it much more likely to sit on the board of directors. Having professional experience prior to venture capital is also related to sitting on a board of directors: almost all venture capitalists who sit on the board have prior experience in finance, and 3 out of 4 also have a science education. Unlike their US colleagues, European venture capitalists are often described as conservative and non-interfering ("hands-off"). Yet the SEVeCa data suggests that by now Europe has a variety of investment styles. 60% of all deals are seed or early stage investments, indicating a healthy risk tolerance. In terms of getting involved with their companies, 68% sit on the board of directors, 69% of all venture capitalists monitor their company on a monthly or weekly basis, and 42% report to help to recruit key managers for their investment companies. The industry is also undergoing some change, where older venture capital firms tend to have more conservative investment styles, while new entrants tend to be more risk-tolerant and get more involved. The data shows that new entrant firms invest more at the seed stage, and they monitor their investments more closely. Interestingly, partners in new entrant firms have the same age as in the old guard firms (the average age of a European venture capitalist is 42 years). This means that they have more prior professional experience. Partners in new entrant firms are also more likely to have a business education and a Masters degree. All of these characteristics help to explain why the new entrant firms adopt investment styles that resemble more closely those of US venture capital firms.
A unique feature of the European market is that a significant number of venture capital firms are owned and managed by banks and corporations. Prior research has shown that in addition to financial goals, such venture capital firms may also have strategic objectives. The SEVeCa data suggests that in Europe, corporate venture capital firms invest more in early stage companies. Partners in these firms have relatively less venture capital experience, although they are more likely to have Masters degrees and/or a science education. By contrast, partners in bank-owned venture capital firms are more likely to have a business education. Most strikingly, bank venture capital firms also invest much less in early stage deals, and they are less likely to frequently monitor their firms or sit on the board of directors.
The SEVeCa study generates many important and novel policy implications. Our first and most important finding is that human capital is a key driver of the investment activities of venture capital firms. Improving the availability of post-graduate education, including executive education or other professional training, is likely to have a very positive effect on the level of professionalism in the industry. Second, the extent of cross-country activity within Europe-and across the Atlantic-shows promising signs of an integrating market. European venture capitalists clearly consider it important to be able to invest outside of their own country. Simplifications of tax rules and cross-border investment regulations are likely to have a strong beneficial impact on the integration of the European venture capital industry. Third, we document a wide variety of behavior by different types of venture firms. It is very important that healthy competition among these different approaches to venture financing be encouraged. Measures which reduce bureaucratic red-tape or which increase the limited partners' ability to invest in all types of venture firm, also cross-orders, are likely to serve this purpose.
1. An overview of European venture capital
The SEVeCa Survey
We sent a questionnaire to 780 venture capital firms in the 15 EU countries, Switzerland, and Norway. We contacted only those venture firms that in 2001 (i) were members of EVCA or of a national venture capital organization, (ii) were actively engaged in venture capital and (iii) were still in operations in 2002. We thus deliberately excluded pure MBO firms. The overall response rate was over 15%.
We received 118 responses with various degrees of completeness. We then spent considerable time augmenting the data with information from a variety of sources, such as the websites of the respondents and commercially available databases like Amadeus or Zephyr. We also contacted all venture firms that had sent us incomplete answers, and managed to complete them in many cases. Overall, we obtained information on more than 150 funds, 480 general partners, 600 limited partners (investors), and 1,300 portfolio companies. This information is relative to funds raised and investments made between January 1998 and December 2001, and to the partners active at the end of that year.
One point worth stressing is the type of venture firm we look at. What exactly constitutes a venture capital firm? This can be a source of some confusion. Traditionally, the industry is segmented into two distinct segments. The "pure venture" segment consists of private equity investments in young companies in high-growth industries that require money to pursue their initial growth targets. Within this segment, it is often distinguished between early and late stage investments. The second major segment is the "LBO/MBO" segment, which consists of private equity investments in established companies that operate in mature industries and require money to solve capital structure problems and/or to pursue additional growth targets. For our research, we wanted to focus on the pure venture capital segment. We therefore considered only firms that operate in that segment. However, venture capital firms can be active in both of these segments, sometimes using separate funds, other times using the same fund to invest in both segments. We thus included both pure venture firms as well as firms which operate in both the venture and the LBO/MBO segments, and excluded those which operate solely in LBOs and MBOs.
Exhibit 1 examines how funds were invested by looking at what percentage of each fund was invested in the pure venture segment. It is clear that LBO/MBO activity is relatively unimportant for our venture capital firms. Our study is thus truly focused on the pure venture segment. That our sample is well representative of the overall European venture capital industry can be inferred also by its sector composition. For instance, Exhibit 3 shows the age distribution of our sample and that of the overall population. The European venture capital industry is still a young industry, having experienced its first boom in the late 1990s. As a consequence, we find that many of our venture capital firms are rather young. The median year of foundation is 1998 for the overall population and 1999 for our sample. In section 2.2 we will return to the question of whether these new entrants are in some way different from the "old guard" of European venture capitalists. Obviously these partners are supported by associates and other staff. Indeed, the typical venture capital firm employs 1.5 other people for every partner, very close to the 2 people of the whole population. However, our data indicate that there are large differences in the number of other employees per partners. Exhibit 6 shows the variation in the number of employees per partners, which ranges from 0 to 18.5. Who owns these venture capital firms? Similar to the US, we find that private independent venture capital firms dominate the industry. Exhibit 7 shows that they account for 70% of our sample. Banks are the second most important category with 15%, and corporations account for 11%. Public venture capital firms account for less than 4%. We will explore the significance of ownership in Section 2.3 below. The Exhibit also shows that our sample closely tracks the ownership composition of the overall population, with the only exception of a low share of public funds. Exhibit 8: investor types
Who manages the money? A profile of European venture capitalists
It is commonly argued that the venture capital business is largely driven by the people who make the investments. Yet, surprisingly little is known about these people and their human capital attributes, such as their educational and professional background or their experience as venture capitalists. Our Survey hopes to begin addressing this important issue by asking: Who are the European venture capitalists, where do they come from, and what do they do?
To start with, our Survey gathers information on over 480 partners (senior managers for bank, corporate and public venture firms). As can be seen from Exhibit 9, these partners have a wide age range, but most of them are around 40 years old, with an average age of 42 years. 
Exhibit 9: Age distribution of European venture capitalists
Their average work experience as venture capitalists is seven years, but varies from zero to 32 years, as shown in Exhibit 10. Interestingly, variation in experience is much more pronounced than variation in age. Another indication of the rapid maturation and growth of the industry is the large share of partners with less than five years of experience. 
Exhibit 10: Distribution of partners' experience as venture capitalists
The fact that nearly half of the partners have less than five years of venturing experience also indicates that many of them must come from other occupations. What kind of prior work experience do these venture capitalists have? From Exhibit 11, we see that nearly half of all partners has some professional experience in the financial sector, and about 40% has some professional experience in the corporate sector. Interestingly, even though business education is still relatively young in Europe, Exhibit 13 shows that a vast majority of venture capitalists has some. This is due in large part to the high number of MBAs. What may come as a surprise is that less than a third actually have an engineering or science education. However, we have seen that a scientific background is most popular among Ph.D.s. This suggests that while relatively few, science-educated partners have a very strong background, and can thus contribute to the effectiveness of investment decisions. In Section 2.4 we will explore the effects of work experience and education on investment decisions.
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Exhibit 13: partners' educational background, by field
Another interesting dimension to look at is the workload of these partners. How busy are these people? Our data suggests they are indeed very busy. For example, we asked how many business plans our venture capital firms received each year. In Exhibit 14 we calculate, for each year, the number of business plans that each firm received, divided by the number of people partners. The data reveal a large and increasing workload, with some people having to make a decision over several hundred business plans a year. An interesting fact we uncover is that the demand for venture finance, far from decreasing after the Dotcom crash, has actually increased. 
What companies do European venture capitalists finance?
Venture capital is ultimately about the companies that get financed. Our Survey covers information on over 1,300 firms financed by European venture capitalists. Exhibit 16 shows the number of companies by country. Not surprisingly, the big three European private equity markets-France, Germany and the UK-show the largest number of firms financed. It is also interesting to see that a fair number of investments is towards the United States, a fact we will return to in Section 2.1. In terms of industries, Exhibit 17 shows that in addition to the usual suspects of biotechnology and software (which includes Internet), also industrial products, medical products and electronics also rank high among European venture capital investments. We notice that software and Internet deals account for about a quarter of all financings. Contrary to a common perception, the European venture capital industry did not just invest in fashionable Internet projects. In fact, the industry is surprisingly well diversified across several high technology industries. Traditionally it has been argued that European venture capital shuns start-ups in favor of already existing firms with a track record. Our evidence suggests that this might no longer be true. In fact, venture financing at early stages, which typically require relatively small sums, is becoming more common in Europe. Another type of evidence that supports this interpretation comes from Exhibit 20, which shows the stage at which the venture capitalists first invested. More than half of the financing rounds was at the seed or start-up stage.
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Exhibit 20: venture deals, by stage
Another myth we can debunk is that European venture capitalists do not know how to cooperate. Instead we find that almost half of all deals are syndicated. In fact, more than 75% of our venture firms took part in a syndicated deal, and about half took on the role of lead at least once.
How do European venture capitalists interact with their companies?
Venture capital is widely believed to be a unique type of financial intermediary.
Research based on US data has shown that venture capital is unique in at least two respects: first because venture capitalists frequently structure sophisticated financial deals; and second because they often become actively involved with their portfolio companies, monitoring and supporting them. Does this also apply to the European venture capital market?
Our Survey asked some questions that concern the degree of contractual sophistication. For example, we asked what financial instruments were used for financing companies. Given that marked differences exists across countries in legal and tax environments, which may influence the appeal of different financial instruments, we took a broad approach and defined four broad classes of financial instruments: pure debt, convertible debt, pure equity, and preferred equity. Exhibit 21 reports the percentage of deals for which each financial instrument was the main one. It shows that pure equity is the true working horse of European venture capital. 
Exhibit 21: main financial instrument used in venture deals
By looking only at the main financial instrument to finance a company, we somewhat understate the actual use of alternative, more sophisticated, financial instruments. In Exhibit 22 we then look at whether any of these financial instruments were used. The picture is now different: European venture capitalists are certainly no strangers to more sophisticated contracts, such as preferred equity or convertible debt. 
Exhibit 22: financial instruments used in venture deals
Further probing the sophistication of contracts, we asked venture capitalists whether they used contingent clauses in their contracts. A contingent clause specifies the circumstances under which a venture capitalist can take certain actions, such as liquidating the company, taking control of the board, or firing the CEO. Exhibit 23 reports the incidence of these contingent control clauses. The right to force a trade sale-that is to sell a portfolio company to an industrial company-is used in more than half of the cases. Other contingent clauses are less common, but they are typically used in at least a third of the deals. Our data reveal two facts which reflect the sophistication of these contracts. First, each deal entails on average the use of more than two contingent clauses, and, second, more than two thirds of the deals does make use of at least one contingent clause. 
Contingent control clauses
Exhibit 26: recruiting for key managerial posts, frequency
Another interesting question is the extent to which companies network within the portfolio of companies of their venture capitalist. This is sometimes referred to as a 'Keiretsu' effect. It reflects another way in which venture capitalists can support their companies: putting them in contact with potential clients and suppliers. We find that less than 5% of all firms have a supplier or client among other portfolio companies of the same venture capitalist. However, this need not be considered low, as recent research on US data reveals similar low incidences for Keiretsu effects. Moreover, the number of venture firms which provide this type of support is far from trivial, totaling about a third of the sample.
A final question concerns the way venture capital firms choose their investments. We asked respondents which were the three most important investment criteria that guide their investment decisions. Exhibit 27 reports the results. Interestingly, most European venture capital firms believe that a good management team is a key criterion. Market size, technology and valuation were also widely cited as key investment criteria. Past performance, strategy and the availability of exit options were not as prominent on the venture capitalists minds. These figures suggest that European venture capitalists are more concerned with the long-term value-creation potential of companies than with the possibility to make short-term financial returns. Overall, we thus find European venture capital firms to be increasingly sophisticated and willing to actively support their firms. 0% 25% 50% 75% 100% M a r k e t s i z e T e c h n o l o g y M a n a g e m e n t V a l u a t i o n P a s t p e r f o r m a n c e S t r a t e g y E a s e o f e x i t
Exhibit 27: investment criteria
One important limitation of the study is the absence of any performance data. In order to secure a high response level the researchers made a conscious choice not to ask about the data that venture capital firms consider most proprietary, namely the rates of return on their investments.
An Analysis of European Venture Capital
How integrated is the European venture capital industry?
Is the European venture capital market a collection of segmented national markets? Or is there a lot of integration, both within Europe, and across the Atlantic with the US and Canada? As the European venture capital industry matures, and venture financing spreads as a the financing option of choice for innovative companies, these questions are becoming very important for both practitioners and for policy-makers who want to foster the growth of the industry. Our data clearly suggests that there is considerable integration within Europe and across the Atlantic. We notice such integration at a three distinct levels.
First, we note that a significant number of venture capital firms have secondary offices. Exhibit 28 shows the number of venture capital firms with secondary offices. We find that one out of four opened a secondary office, most of them in France and in the UK. It also shows the countries where these are located. The single most popular destination for the secondary office is the US. Within Europe, the Netherlands and Germany registered the most secondary offices. 
Exhibit 31: percentage of foreign investments, by industry
Overall, our data show a surprisingly high integration of the European venture capital industry at all levels. This changes the common perception that venture capital is a purely local business and that European venture capitalists limit themselves to investing in the domestic economy.
Are the new venture capital funds different from the older ones?
We noted before that at the end of the 1990s there was a wave of new entrants into the venture capital industry. An important question relates to whether these new entrants are any different from the 'old guard.' One might conjecture that partners in the new firms are younger. A lot has been said about the young age of many of the Dotcom entrepreneurs. Is this also true for the new venture capitalists? Our data suggests not. The average partner age in the new entrant venture firms (i.e., those opened after 1997) was 42, which is just below the average age of 43 in older firms.
But even though partners of new entrants are not younger, they are still different. For example, consider their educational background. Exhibit 32 shows the educational achievements for the two types of firms. And Exhibit 33 shows their fields of education.
The new entrants show a higher proportion of Masters, and greater emphasis on a business education. Also, the overall educational achievement of new entrants is higher than for the old guard. An intriguing result of our study is that not only were new entrants different. They also specialized in different sectors. Exhibit 35 shows that the new entrants emphasized software and Internet deals. Both partners' backgrounds and investment patterns are consistent with the notion that the venture capital boom of the late nineties was largely driven by business opportunities (in particular the Internet), rather than more technological opportunities. Note, however, that the difference with the old guard is not enormous, mainly because the old guard itself invested heavily in that sector. The biggest difference between the new entrants and old guard are thus in the entertainment and media sector. Interestingly, where the old guard remains strongest are the biotechnology and medical sectors. Finally, we note that the new entrants tend to be more closely involved with their companies, in terms of a higher monitoring intensity. Exhibit 37 confirms that new entrants are 10% more likely to monitor their companies intensively.
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Exhibit 37: monitoring frequency, by cohort of venture firms
Overall we see that there is a marked difference between the old guard and the new entrants. The new entrants have adopted an investment style that by-and-large can be characterized as more risk-tolerant and more hands-on than the older generation of European venture capital firms.
Do different types of venture capital firms behave differently?
Does it matter who owns the venture capital firm? For this, we consider whether independent, bank, public, and corporate venture capital firms behave differently. There is a debate about whether we should expect each of these firm types to invest differently. For instance, one may ask whether banks are well positioned to take a leadership role in the origination of early stage venture deals. Or whether a strategic motivation precludes corporate investors from investing in lower technology companies. To shed some light on the respective roles and styles of the different types of venture capital firms, we let the data speak.
First we reconsider the age and experience of partners across the four different types of venture firms. Exhibit 38 shows that, while their ages are quite similar, independent venture capitalists have twice as much experience as corporate or public venture capitalists do. The commitment to monitor or take a board seats is also quite different across types of venture firms. We simplify the information from Exhibit 24 by creating two levels of monitoring, high and low. We say that venture capitalists have a high monitoring intensity if they personally interact with a company at least on a monthly basis. Exhibit 43 shows that independent venture capitalists have the highest monitoring intensity, closely followed by corporate investors. Once again, bank and public venture capitalists behave differently, and interact less frequently with the firms they invest in. Overall, we find considerable differences in the investment styles of independent, corporate and bank venture capitalists, which had not been systematically documented for the European venture capital market so far. Who owns a venture firms does make an important difference.
How does the partner's human capital affect venture investments?
If venture capital is driven by its people, we can now ask how the human capital of venture capitalists affects investment behavior. A novel aspect of our research is to focus on the people dimension of venture capital. We believe our findings are intriguing. We focus on three measurable differences between venture capitalists:
(i) First we consider educational achievements. We ask whether there are systematic differences among venture partners depending on whether they have a bachelor degree, a master, or a Ph.D.. One of the notable strength of our data is that we can relate each partner to the portfolio companies (s)he supervises.
(ii) Second, we consider educational backgrounds. In particular, we ask whether partners who went through scientific studies invest differently than others. Presumably, partners with a scientific education may have an advantage in gaining a deeper technological understanding of their investment companies. But not all venture capital investments demand such specialized knowledge, and so we ask whether a division of labor naturally arises among partners with different types of education.
(iii) Third, we ask whether the professional experience of partners also matters. In particular, we want to understand whether partners with a financial background invest differently than those without it. Our conjecture is that a financial background provides partners with a different lens of looking at and interacting with their portfolio companies.
In our analysis we make some simple assumptions to help us make the best use of the richness of our data. If more than one partner is reported to be in charge of a portfolio company, we use the highest educational level among the various partners in charge. Likewise, if several partners are listed to be in charge of a particular company, we report whether at least one of them had a scientific education or some working experience in finance. This approach has the advantage of making use of all available information, and in particular of taking into account all the expertise which is at work when a partner, or a team of partners, takes charge of a company. Finally, we note that different partners may take different attitudes towards interacting with their companies. Exhibits 53 and 54 examine how the frequency of interaction with a portfolio firm is related to the human capital of the responsible partners. We find that the frequency of interaction decreases somewhat with the level of the degree. We also find that a scientific background is more conducive to frequent interaction than work experience in finance. This might be a reflection of two factors. First, the higher propensity or partners with a scientific background to invest in high-tech companies, which are more likely than those in mature industry to require frequent advice and interaction. Second, a science education may itself generate a higher propensity to interact since technically-minded partners may take a more active interest in the development of the technologies being developed at portfolio companies. Overall, the data suggests that human capital is important for the way that venture capitalists invest and relate their portfolio companies. Higher education, a background in science, and prior professional experiences all have an impact on where venture capitalists invests and how they can add value to their companies.
Conclusion
The SEVeCa survey is a unique large-scale project to gather systematic data on the state of the European venture capital industry. We were concerned not only with providing descriptive data on European venture capital firms, but also on the human capital of venture capital partners, and the investment practices they adopt. The survey provides some new and intriguing findings. The European venture capital industry is more integrated than previously suspected. The industry is currently undergoing a change of guard, where new entrant firms show more interest in adopting "hands-on" investment practices. The large presence of bank-owned and corporate-owned venture capital firms contributes to the considerable heterogeneity of the European venture capital industry. And human capital is a critical determinant of the investment style of venture capital firms.
True to our academic roots, we insist on one final word of caution. The data presented in this report consists of descriptive statistics and simple cross-tabulations. To provide a more complete analysis of the behavior of European venture capital firms, it is necessary to provide a more comprehensive conceptual framework, in which multivariate regressions are used to evaluate statistical relationships between the variables of interest. We have already begun with this more systematic work, and refer the interested reader to our respective web pages, which contain regular updates on our academic writings.
